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INTRODUCTION

At common law, the sale or gift of intoxicating beverages to
ordinary able-bodied men did not give rise to a cause of action
against a licensed vendor, social host or employer for the torts of
the intoxicated customer or guest.' The reasoning for the general
rule at common law was that the consumption of the intoxicating
liquor, and not the furnishing of it, was the proximate cause of any
subsequent alcohol-related injury.2
In response to this hardship in the common law, many states
enacted statutes known as "dram shop acts," ' 3 giving a right of
action to injured third parties against licensed vendors who supply
1. See generally Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965); Ling v. Jan's Liquors,
237 Kan. 629, 703 P.2d 731 (1985); Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976); Hamm
v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969).
2. See cases cited supra note 1.
3. Dram shop acts are also sometimes referred to as "civil liability" acts or "civil damage"
acts.
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intoxicating beverages to minors and obviously intoxicated persons.4
Many other states have not enacted dram shop acts, but have judicially imposed liability on licensed vendors, social hosts and employers under one of three theories of liability: (1) negligence per
se for the violation of alcohol beverage control statutes;5 (2) common
law negligence principles based upon the violation of a statutory
7
duty; 6 and (3) pure negligence principles.

West Virginia currently does not have a dram shop act 8 or social
liability legislation. 9 West Virginia does, however, judicially recog-

nize a tort cause of action, under common law negligence principles,
against licensed vendors for injuries proximately resulting from a
violation of an alcohol beverage control statute. 10
This note first examines the three primary theories used nationwide to judicially impose civil liability on licensed vendors, social
hosts and employers. Secondly, this note focuses on the changes in
civil liquor liability in West Virginia. The Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia recently recognized causes of action against licensed

4. Fourteen states and the District of Columbia have dram shop acts currently in force:
ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
30-102 (West Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANm. § 25-121 (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.125 (West
1986); IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, para. 135-136 (Smith-Hurd 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West
1987); MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 436.22 (West 1989); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.801 (West Supp.
1990); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121 to 129 (1989);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06.1 (1987); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page's 1989); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 47, § 4-497 (Purdon 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-14-6, -7 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §
501 (1988).

5. For a discussion of liability under the theory of negligence per se for violations of alcohol
beverage control statutes, see infra notes 18, 19, 32 and accompanying text. Alcohol beverage control
statutes prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor to specified individuals and impose fines and/or criminal
penalties for their violations and should be distinguished from dram shop acts.
6. For a discussion of liability under the theory of common law negligence, see infra notes
20-22, 33 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of liability under the theory of pure negligence, see infra notes 25, 26,
35-37 and accompanying text.
8. West Virginia enacted a civil damage act by 1872-73 W. Va. Acts ch. 99, § 6, which was
codified in the 1906 code at ch. 32, § 26 and in the 1931 code at § 60-1-22. The provision, however,
was repealed by 1935 W. Va. Acts ch. 4.
9. For an example of current social host liability legislation, see N.J. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:15-5.5 to 5.8 (West 1988).
10. See Bailey v. Black, 394 S.E.2d 58 (W. Va. 1990); Anderson v. Moulder, 394 S.E.2d 61
(W. Va. 1990).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/7

2

Summers: Judicially Imposed Liquor Liability and Developments in West Virg
1991]

LIQUOR LIABILITY

vendors under the theory that the violation of an alcohol beverage
control statute is prima facie evidence of negligence." In Bailey v.
Black,12 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia recognized
a cause of action against tavern owners for the violation of a statute
making it illegal for a licensed vendor to sell alcohol to intoxicated
persons.' 3 Additionally, in Anderson v. Moulder, 4 the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia recognized a cause of action against
a beer distributor for the violation of a statute making it illegal for
a licensed vendor to sell beer to a person under twenty-one years
of age.'- The Supreme Court of Appeals, however, in Overbaugh
v. McCutcheon, 6 would not recognize civil liability on the part of
a social host or employer who gratuitously furnished alcohol to a
guest who subsequently injured third parties as a result of the guest's
intoxication.' 7 Finally, this note concludes by synthesizing the present West Virginia case law to determine when a licensed vendor will
be held liable and whether such liability could be extended to social
hosts and employers.
II.

NEGLIGENCE TlamO~IEs USED To IMPOSE CIVIL LIABILITY ON
LICENSED VENDORS, SOCIAL HOSTS AND EMPLOYERS

A.

Licensed Vendors
The first of the three primary theories state courts have used to
impose civil liability upon licensed vendors is that the violation of
an alcohol beverage control statute constitutes negligence per se.' 8
11. Bailey v. Black, 394 S.E.2d 58; Anderson v. Moulder, 394 S.E.2d 61.
12. 394 S.E.2d 58.
13. Id. at 59 (violation of W. VA. CoDE § 60-7-12 (1986)).
14. 394 S.E.2d 61.
15. Id. at 66-67 (violation of W. VA. CODE § 11-16-18(a)(3) (1986)).
16. Overbaugh v. McCutcheon, 396 S.E.2d 153 (W. Va. 1990).
17. Id. at 158-59.
18. See Burke v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 570, 181 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1982) (violation
of statute prohibiting sale of liquor to minor could form basis for negligence per se if proximate
cause can be proved); Barson v. Gate Petroleum Co., 401 So. 2d 922, (Fla. App. 1981) (negligence
per se results from violation of statute); Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973)
(tavern sold alcohol to minors in violation of beverage control statute); Munford, Inc. v. Peterson,
368 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1979) (market sold alcohol to minors in violation of beverage control statute);
Baatz v. Arrow Bar, 426 N.W.2d 298 (S.D. 1988) (violation of statute prohibiting sale of liquor to
an intoxidated person was negligence as a matter of law); Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash. 2d 220, 737
P.2d 661 (1987) (restaurant was negligent per se for having served alcoholic beverages to minor in
violation ofby
statute).
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Under the negligence per se theory, once a plaintiff establishes that

the licensed vendor has violated an alcohol beverage control statute,
any inquiry into the standard of care of the licensed vendor is foreclosed. 19

Secondly, based on common law negligence principles, state courts
have imposed civil liability on licensed vendors when an alcohol
beverage control statute has been violated. 20 These courts have reasoned that the statutes impose a duty on the licensed vendor to
protect the general public from intoxicated customers. 2 Therefore,

when a vendor serves a person in violation of a statute, that is a
breach of the minimum statutory standard of care establishing a
common law negligence cause of action. Under the common law
negligence theory, violation of an alcohol beverage control statute
is prima facie evidence of negligence.22
Some jurisdictions refuse to impose civil liability upon licensed
vendors even when a beverage control statute has been violated,
reasoning that it is up to the legislature to create a cause of action
against licensed vendors through enactment of dram shop acts.23

19. See generally, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
20. See Ono v. Applegate, 62 Haw. 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980); Bisset v. DMI, Inc., 220 Mont.
153, 717 P.2d 545 (1986) (violation of statute by licensed vendor is evidence of negligence); Ramsey
v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965) (violation of statute is evidence of negligence); Lopez
v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982).
21. See Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959) (a common law
negligence action existed under a duty imposed by alcoholic beverage control statute); Cuevas v. Royal
D'Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346 (Miss. 1986) (the public is protected under statute prohibiting sale
of alcoholic beverages to visibly intoxicated persons from negligence acts of such intoxicated persons,
and has claim against vendor violating statute); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959)
(vendors served a minor in violation of beverage control statutes that created a duty to the general
public); Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982) (tavern owner served an intoxicated
patron in violation of the beverage control statutes that created a duty to the general public); Campbell
v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237, 566 P.2d 893 (1977) (tavern owner who sold intoxicants to an intoxicated
person in violation of a penal statute owed a duty to the travelling public).
22. Courts prefer to recognize common law negligence actions, rather than negligence per se
actions so to avoid placing the presumption of negligence on vendors. See Easterday, The Indiana
ComparatureFaultAct: How Does It Compare With OtherJurisdictions?,17 IND. L. RBv. 883 (1984).
23. See Lewis v. Wolf, 122 Ariz. 567, 596 P.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1979) (no liability for vendor
violating beverage control statute in absence of dram shop act); Keaton v. Kroger Co., 143 Ga. App.
23, 237 S.E.2d 443 (1977) (in absence of legislation, a licensed vendor is not liable for selling to
minor in violation of beverage control statute); Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976)
(in absence of legislation, a licensed vendor is not liable to third parties injured by intoxicated persons
to whom vendor has served in violation of beverage control statutes).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/7
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Additionally, some courts refuse to impose civil liability for the violation of a statute so as not to deviate from the common law. 24
Finally, a few state courts impose liability on licensed vendors
based upon pure negligence principles.25 These courts recognize that
a licensed vendor owes a duty to others when his or her acts create
a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to third parties, and
do not rely on a violation of a statutory duty. Negligence is established by showing the licensed vendor knew or should have known
he was serving intoxicating beverages to a minor or an intoxicated
person who would be driving, and the resulting accident would not
6
have occurred but for the intoxication.2
B.

Social Hosts and Employers

Courts have not been as aggressive in imposing civil liability on
social hosts or employers for serving intoxicating beverages to guests
or employees who thereafter injure third parties as a result of the
intoxication. Generally, employers are categorized by courts as social
hosts and therefore have been treated similarly. 27 Most state courts
have been reluctant to use violations of statutes 28 or pure negligence
24. See Yancey v. Beverage House of Little Rock, Inc., 29 Ark. 217, 723 S.W.2d 826 (1987)
(the court would not deviate from common law and impose liability on licensed vendors for injuries
caused by those who drink intoxicants); Fudge v. Kansas City, 239 Kan. 369, 720 P.2d 1093 (1986)
(no cause of action against a licensed vendor, since common law dispensers of alcohol are not liable
to victims of intoxicated tortfeasors, even if they violate the beverage control statute).
25. These courts have found licensed vendors civilly liable using pure negligence principles and
common law negligence principles based upon the violation of an alcohol beverage control statute,
reasoning that the licensed vendor owes a duty to the general public recognized by common law and
statute. Brannigan v. Raybuck, 136 Ariz. 513, 667 P.2d 213 (1983); El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732
S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987).
26. W. PROSSER, HAINDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, n.7 (4th ed. 1971).
27. Comment, Employer Liabilityfor a Drunken Employee's Actions Following an Office Party:
A Cause of Action Under Respondeat Superior, 19 CA. W.L. REv. 107 (1982).
28. For examples of courts that do not recognize a cause of action against a social host or
employer for violation of a statute, see Bass v. Pratt, 177 Cal. App. 3d 129, 222 Cal. Rptr. 723
(1986); Slicer v. Quigley, 180 Conn. 252, 429 A.2d 855 (1980) (no liability for host despite statutory
violation); Fuhrman v. Total Petroleum, Inc. 398 N.W.2d 807 (Iowa 1987); Boutwel v. Sullivan, 469
So. 2d 526 (Miss. 1985) (beverage control statute does not apply to situation in which a social host
allegedly serves beer to an individual who was intoxicated); Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d
145 (1979) (no liability for social hosts serving intoxicating liquors to minors); Manning v. Andy, 454
Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973) (employers are not liable for violations of a statute applicable only to
licensed vendors); Hulse v. Driver, I1 Wash. App. 509, 524 P.2d 255 (1974) (no liability for social
companion who violated statute by furnishing alcohol to minors).
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principles 29 to extend civil liability to social hosts or employers, reasoning that such hosts are unlikely to have extensive liability insurance, the expertise to judge the degree of intoxication of the

guests, or the control and supervision necessary to protect their guests
or employees. 0 Some courts have refused to impose liability reasoning that the legislature is best equipped to resolve the competing
31
considerations implicated by such a cause of action.
Some courts, however, have imposed civil liability on social hosts
and employers for injuries caused by their intoxicated guests and
employees, based on the same three theories used to impose liability
on licensed vendors. First, a few jurisdictions have imposed liability
on social hosts under the negligence per se theory for violations of
alcohol beverage control statutes, but have done so only in the limited situations where an adult host has served intoxicants to a minor. 2
Secondly, some courts have chosen not to place the presumption
of negligence on the social host or employer for violations of alcohol
29. For examples of courts that do not recognize a pure negligence cause of action against a
social host or an employer, see Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp., 460 F. Supp. 80 (D.C.D.C. 1978) (no
common law negligence action against employers buying drinks for employees after hours); DeLoach
v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co., 378 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1979) (no cause of action for employers furnishing
alcohol to employees); Behnke v. Pierson, 21 Mich. App. 219, 175 N.W.2d 303 (1970) (no cause of
action against employers who furnish intoxicants to employees at a company party); Harriman v.
Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. App. 1985) (no common law liability on the part of a social host who
serves alcohol in his home to an intoxicated guest who subsequently injures a third party); Klein v.
Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d 507 (1983) (Pennsylvania law does not recognize a cause of action
against a nonlicensed, social host who furnishes alcohol to intoxicated guests); Garren v. Cummings
& McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508 (1986) (social hosts have no common law or statutory
liability to third parties injured as a result of a guest's intoxication).
30. See Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 705 P.2d 945 (1985); Garren v. Cummings &
McCrady, Inc., 289 S.C. 348, 345 S.E.2d 508 (1986).
31. See Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1987) (refusing to recognize a common
law cause of action against a social host, reasoning that the state legislature was best equipped to
resolve the competing considerations implicated by such a cause of action); Chidress v. Sams, 736
S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1987) (the legislature must decide whether there is a common law negligence action
against a social host).
32. See Burke v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 570, 181 Cal. Rptr. 149 (4th Dist. 1982);
Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974) (furnishing alcohol to a minor in
violation of statute constitutes negligence per se); Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d
820 (1973) (violation of a penal statute prohibiting the furnishing of alcoholic beverages to minors,
by the host of a wedding reception, would constitute negligence per se); Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis.
2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984) (finding a social host negligent per se for violating the criminal law
by furnishing beer and liquor to a minor, because the statutes apply not only to licensed vendors,
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/7
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beverage control statues, but have used common law negligence principles to find a violation of an alcohol beverage control statute as

prima facie negligence. 3 The broad language of most alcohol beverage control statutes signals the intent of legislatures to impose
liability not only on licensed vendors, but on social hosts and em-

ployers as well. 34 Therefore, if a court uses a violation of a broad
language statute to impose liability on a licensed vendor, it follows
that the same violation may be used to impose liability on social
hosts and employees. Additionally, the courts that extend liability
to social hosts should logically extend liability to employers.
Finally, the third theory courts have used to establish civil lia-

bility for social hosts35 and employers 36 furnishing intoxicants is pure
33. See Clendening v. Shipton, 149 Cal. App. 3d 191, 196 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1983); Sutter v.
Hutchings, 174 Ga. App. 743, 332 S.E.2d 175 (1985) (statutory duty to protect third parties); Gariup
Constr. Co. v. Foster, 519 N.E.2d 1224 (Ind. 1988) (refusing to extend common law liquor liability
to purely social hosts, except in cases involving the breach of a statutory duty); Ashlock v. Norris,
475 N.E.2d 1167 (Ind. App. 1985); Bauer v. Dann, 428 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1988); Traxler v. Kosposky,
148 Mich. App. 514, 384 N.W.2d 819 (1986) (alcohol served in violation of statute); Walker v. Key,
101 N.M. 631, 686 P.2d 973 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding a host who furnished liquor to a minor in
violation of statute liable for injuries to third parties); Douglas v. Schwenk, 330 Pa. Super. 392, 479
A.2d 608 (1984).
34. The broad language usually used includes the terms "any person" instead of just licensee
or permittee, and "give" in conjunction with "sell."
35. For examples of courts that use pure negligence theories to impose civil liability on social
hosts, see Gordon v. Alaska Pacific Bancorporation, 753 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1988) (finding a host liable
for injuries to a guest, for the host had a duty to provide protection, knowing that, among other
things, intoxicated people would be on the premises); Clendening v. Shipton, 149 Cal. App. 3d 191,
196 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1983); McGuiggan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 398 Mass. 152, 496 N.E.2d
141 (1986); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (finding a host who serves liquor
to an adult, knowing both that the guest is intoxicated and will thereafter be driving, liable for injuries
inflicted on a third party by the guest, because a host has a duty to the public not to create foreseeable,
unreasonable risks); Baird v. Roach, Inc., I1 Ohio App. 3d 16, 462 N.E.2d 1229 (1983) (holding that
a host can be held liable where the host knew the guest was intoxicated and would probably create
an unreasonable risk of harm to third persons); Solberg v. Johnson, 306 Or. 484, 760 P.2d 867 (1988);
Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971)
(a cause of action exists against a host on the theory that the host ought to have known that guest
was a minor and that he would be driving after the party, and therefore serving alcohol to the minor
was unreasonable); Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985) (finding that hosts
could be held liable on common law negligence grounds for failing to exercise ordinary care in supplying intoxicating beverages).
36. For examples of courts that use pure negligence theories to impose civil liability on employers, see Chaistain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1106 (1983) (under pure negligence principles, an employer is liable for the torts of an intoxicated
employee, even though a statute was not violated); Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal.
App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972) (a cause of action exists where a minor's intoxication was
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negligence. The courts reason that a host creates a duty when his
or her acts create a foreseeable, unreasonable risk of harm to third
parties. 37 Additionally, the theory of respondeat superior, has also
been used to impose civil liability on an employer who furnishes

intoxicating 38beverages to an employee who subsequently injures a
third party.
III.

A.

WEST VIRGInA LIQUOR LIABILITY

Legislative History

West Virginia does not have a dram shop act 39 or social host
controlling the sellliability legislation, but has enacted four statutes
4° nonintoxicating beer 4'
liquors,
alcoholic
of
giving
or
ing, furnishing

induced as a result of an employer's Christmas party and the employer knew the minor would thereafter be driving); Gariup Constr. Co. v. Foster, 519 N.E.2d 1224 (Ind. 1988) (a relationship exists
between a host employer, an intoxicated employee, and a third-person motorist which as a matter
of law gives rise to a duty on the part of an employer to exercise ordinary and reasonable care);
Romeo v. VanOtterloo, 117 Mich. App. 333, 323 N.W.2d 693 (1982) (employer could be liable for
the tort of an employee who hosted a business related party, reasoning that the employment relationship created a duty for the employer to supervise the party and provide intoxicated guests with
safe transportation home).
37. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (4th ed. 1971).
38. For a comprehensive discussion of the theory of respondeat superior and its use to impose
civil liability on employers who furnish intoxicating beverages to employees who subsequently injure
third parties, see Comment, Employer Liabilityfor a Drunken Employee'sActions Following an Office
Party: A Cause of Action Under Respondeat Superior, 19 CAL. W.L. Ray. 107 (1982).
39. The former West Virginia Civil Damages Act of 1873 provided in part that:
Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who shall be injured
in person or property, or means of support by any intoxicated person, or in consequence
of intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall have a right of action in his
or her name, severally or jointly, against any person shall by selling or giving intoxicating
liquors, have caused the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person or persons.
1872-73 W. Va. Acts ch. 99, § 6.
Theoretically, the former West Virginia civil damage act could have been construed against social
hosts or employers, because it provided for a cause of action when intoxicating liquors were "given"
to a person causing intoxication.
40. The State Retail Liquor License Act, W. VA. CODE § 60-3A-l to -31 (Supp. 1990); The
Liquor Control Act regarding Licenses to Private Clubs, W. VA. CODE § 60-7-1 to -17 (1989).
41. The Nonintoxicating Beer Act, W. VA. CODE § 11-16-1 to -29 (1987); The Liquor Control
Act regarding Licenses to Private Clubs, W. VA. CODE § 60-7-1 to -17 (1989).
The term "nonintoxicating" is used to distinguish between beer and liquor, for the purpose of
regulating and controlling its sale and facilitating the enforcement and collection of the license taxes
imposed. See Payne v. Kinder, 147 W. Va. 352, 373, 127 S.E.2d 726, 740 (1962).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/7
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and wine. 42 These four beverage control statutes were intended to
provide for the, "protection of the public safety, welfare, health,
peace and morals and ... to eliminate, or to minimize to the extent
practicable, the evils attendant to the unregulated... and unlawful
...
sale, distribution ... and consumption of such beverages." 43
These beverage control statutes are the same type as those used by
other state courts to impose civil liability when violated, based upon
the theory of negligence per se" and common law negligence principles. 45 Considering that West Virginia courts recognize a violation
of a standard of care established by a statute constitutes prima facie
evidence of negligence, there is a foundation in West Virginia law
for imposing civil liability based upon violations of the state's alcohol beverage control statutes. 46 West Virginia Code § 55-7-9 also
expressly recognizes a cause of action in tort for the violation of
any statute. 47
West Virginia Code § 60-7-12 prohibits licensees of private clubs
to, "sell, [or] ... give away any alcoholic liquors, for or to any
person less than twenty-one years of age, 48 . . . any mental incompetent, or to a person who is physically incapacitated due to the
consumption of alcoholic liquor or the use of drugs," 4 9 or to "permit the consumption by, or serve to, on the premises any alcoholic
liquors ... to any person wio is less than twenty-one years of
age."

50

42. The Liquor Control Act regarding Sale of Wines, W. VA. CODE § 60-8-1 to -35 (1989);
The Liquor Control Act regarding Licenses to Private Clubs, W. VA. CODE § 60-7-I to -17 (1989).
43. W. VA. CODE § 11-16-2 (1987).
44. For examples of courts which impose civil liability upon a violation of an alcohol beverage
control statute as constituting negligence per se, see infra notes 18 and 32.
45. For an example of courts which impose civil liability based on common law negligence
principles for violations of alcohol beverage control statutes, see infra notes 20, 21 and 33.
46. E.g., Price v. Halstead, 355 S.E.2d 380 (f. Va. 1987); Vandergrift v. Johnson, 157 W.
Va. 958, 206 S.E.2d 515 (1974); Lewis v. Mclntire, 150 W. Va. 117, 144 S.E.2d 319 (1965); Somerville
v. Dellosa, 133 W. Va. 435, 56 S.E.2d 657 (1949).
47. W. VA. CODE § 55-7-9 (1981) provides that:
Any person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such
damages as he may sustain by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture for
such violation be thereby imposed, unless the same be expressly mentioned to be in lieu
of such damages.
48. W. VA. CODE § 60-7-12(a)(3) (1989).
49. Id. § 60-7-12(a)(4) (1989).
50. Id. § 60-7-12(a)(6) (1989).
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West Virginia Code § 60-3A-25 prohibits licensees of state liquor
who is less than twentystores to sell alcoholic beverages to a person
52
5I
intoxicated.
one years of age, or visibly
West Virginia Code § 60-8-20 makes it unlawful for, "a licensee,
his servants, agents or employees to sell, furnish or give wine to any
person less than twenty-one years of age, or to a mental incompetent,
due to the consumption
or to a person who is physically incapacitated
53
of alcoholic liquor or the use of drugs.
West Virginia Code § 11-16-18 makes it unlawful "for any licensee, his, her, its or their servants, agents or employees, to sell,
furnish or give any nonintoxicating beer ... to any person visibly
or noticeably intoxicated, or to any person known to be insane or
known to be a habitual drunkard," 54 or to, "any person who is less
than twenty-one years of age." 55
West Virginia Code §§ 60-7-12a, 60-3A-24(b), and 60-8-20a also
contain provisions entitled "[u]nlawful acts by persons. ' ' 56 These sections make it unlawful for "any person" to knowingly buy for, give
or furnish to anyone under the age of twenty-one, to whom they are
not related by blood or marriage, any nonintoxicating beer or alcoholic liquors purchased from a licensee5 7 or from whatever source,5
or wine or other alcoholic liquors from any source.59 These provisions
suggest that a cause of action could be maintained against a social
host or an employer who violates a statute by knowingly furnishing
alcoholic beverages to persons less than twenty-one years of age.
B.

Case Law

1. Licensed Vendors
In Bailey v. Black,6° a case of first impression, the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia addressed whether a licensed vendor,
51. Id. § 60-3A-25(a)(2) (Supp. 1990).
52. Id. § 60-3A-25(a)(3) (Supp. 1990).
53. Id. § 60-8-20(c) (1989).
54. Id. § 11-16-18(a)(2) (1987).
55. Id. § 11-16-18(a)(3) (1987).
56. W. VA. CODE § 60-7-12a (1989); id. § 60-3A-24(b) (Supp. 1990); id. § 60-8-20a (1989).
57. W. VA. CODE § 60-7-12a(b).
58. Id. § 60-3A-24(b).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/7
59. W. VA. CODE § 60-8-20a(b).
60. 394 S.E.2d 58 (W. Va. 1990).
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who sells alcohol to an intoxicated person in violation of a statute, 61
was liable for the damages suffered by others as a result of the illegal
sale.62 In Bailey, the widow and executrix of Mr. Bailey brought a
wrongful death action against the Blacks, individually and as owners
of the Stoney Brook Inn, for damages caused by Ms. Sells, an intoxicated patron of the Black's Inn. On October 16, 1986, Ms. Sells
purchased and consumed several beers at the Black's tavern over a
period of almost four hours, until ejected from the Inn by the Blacks
after having a heated argument with other patrons of the Inn.
The Blacks responded by filing a third-party indemnity complaint
against Ms. Sells, who in turn counter-claimed against the Blacks
to recover damages for her own injuries. The trial court entered
summary judgment in favor of the Blacks, holding as a matter of
law that the Blacks, as licensed vendors, were not liable either to
63
Mrs. Bailey or Ms. Sells.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed and remanded the case, holding that a licensed vendor who
sells alcohol to an intoxicated person, in violation of a statute, was
64
liable for damages suffered by others as a result of the illegal sale.
The Court based its decision on two statutes, West Virginia Code
§ 55-7-9, which provides that any person injured by the violation
of a statute may recover damages from the offender, 65 and West
Virginia Code § 60-7-12, making it illegal for a licensee to sell alcohol to any person "physically incapacitated due to consumption
of alcoholic liquor. ' 66 The Bailey Court adopted the common law
negligence theory of civil liability based upon a violation of an alcohol beverage control statute, citing Lopez v. Maez67 and Ono v.
Applegate68 as examples of cases where courts used the same ap69
proach to impose civil liability.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

W. VA. CODE § 60-7-12(a)(6) (1989).
Bailey, 394 S.E.2d at 59.
Id.
Id.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-9 (1981), supra note 47.

66. Bailey, 394 S.E.2d at 59. Violation of W. VA. CODE § 60-7-12 is a misdemeanor. Id.
67. 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982) (violation of N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-7A-16 (1981)).
68. 62 Haw. 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980) (violation of HAw.Rav. STAT. § 281-78 (1985)).
69. For
of otherRepository
cases that recognize
breach of alcohol beverage control statutes
Disseminated
byexamples
The Research
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as a cause of action under common law negligence principles, see infra notes 20, 21 and 33.

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

The court established the standard of care for licensed vendors
by interpreting the "physically incapacitated" language of West Virginia Code § 60-7-12 to mean that the licensed vendor must be capable of knowing that the buyer was drunk. 70 Therefore, the buyer
must have exhibited physical signs of drunkenness or multiple drinks
must have been served over a comparatively short period of time
such that a reasonably prudent server of alcohol should have known
that the buyer was drunk. 71 The court also determined that the scope
of the statutory duty extended to those whom § 60-7-12 was intended
to protect and those who suffered the sort of harm the statute was
meant to prevent 2 The court, therefore, found that the plain meaning of § 60-7-12 was intended to protect the incapacitated person. 3
As for third persons, the court concluded West Virginia Code § 557-9 protected "any person injured by the violation of any statute"
and thus injured third parties could recover for damages proximately
caused by the violation of § 60-7-12(a)(4). 74
In Anderson v. Moulder,7 5 Mr. Keesee, an employee and agent
of the Mercer Wholesale Company, a licensed beer distributor, allegedly sold a keg of beer to seventeen year old Sean Anderson.
Three days later, Anderson died in an automobile accident. He was
a passenger in a vehicle driven by eighteen year old David Moulder.
Both Anderson and Moulder were allegedly intoxicated due to their
consumption of the beer Anderson purchased from Keesee. The estate of the decedent brought a wrongful death action against Moulder,76 Keesee, and Mercer Wholesale Company.
The Anderson court acknowledged the common law precedent
that the sale of liquor to ordinary able-bodied men did not give rise
to any civil liability against the licensed vendor for injuries caused
by intoxication.77 The court recognized, however, that many juris70. Bailey, 394 S.E.2d at 60.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 394 S.E.2d 61 (W. Va. 1990).
76. Id. at 65, n.1 ("Moulder also filed a third-party complaint against Mercer Wholesale Company and a cross-claim against Mercer Wholesale Company and Keesee").
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/7
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77. Id. at 66.
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dictions have adopted dram shop acts to ameliorate the hardship at
common law, 78 that West Virginia Code § 55-7-9 expressly authorizes
civil liability based on a violation of a statute, 79 and that there is
a growing trend in other jurisdictions to predicate licensed vendor
liability on violations of alcohol beverage control statutes. 80 The court
reasoned that the prohibition against selling beer to individuals under
the age of twenty-one represents the legislative intent to protect both
the underage purchaser and the public in general from the consequences of such illegal sales. 81 The legislative recognized the danger
that the underage drinkers preseited to themselves and others beto handle the in-"
cause of their immaturity and lack of capability
82
alcohol.
of
toxicative and addictive effects
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia concluded therefore, that the sale of beer in violation of West Virginia Code § 1116-18(a)(3) ,83 making it unlawful for a licensee to sell beer to a person under the age of twenty-one, gives rise to a cause of action
against a licensed vendor in favor of a purchaser or a third party
injured as a proximate result of the unlawful sale. 84 The court noted,
however, that the violation of a statute in West Virginia is only
prima facie evidence of negligence. 85 Accordingly, a licensee who
sells beer to a person under the age of twenty-one may rebut the
showing of negligence by proving that the purchaser appeared to be
of age and that the licensed vendor used reasonable means of identification to ascertain his age. 6
With respect to proximate cause, the court determined that when
a licensed vendor negligently sells alcoholic beverages to a person

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
See W. VA. CODE § 55-7-9 (1981), supra note 47.
Anderson, 394 S.E.2d at 67.
Id. See W. VA. CODE § 11-16-2 (1987).
Anderson, 394 S.E.2d at 68.

83. For the purpose of this statute, a licensee includes brewers or manufacturers, distributors,
and retailers. See W. VA. CODE §§ 11-16-3, -5, -18 (1987).
84. Anderson, 394 S.E.2d at 68. Cf. Johnson v. Kotval, 369 N.W.2d 584 (Minn. App. 1985)
(finding no cause of action against a wholesale distributor that violated an alcohol beverage control

statute, because sale was too far removed from injury to constitute proximate cause).
85. Anderson, 394 S.E.2d at 68.
86. Id.
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under twenty-one years of age, the vendor can reasonably foresee
that such minor will consume all or part of such beverages, become
intoxicated, and as a result, injure himself or a third party." Additionally, the court ruled that a licensed vendor in certain circumstances can reasonably foresee that the underage purchaser will share
such beverages with other minors, who will, in turn, become intoxicated and cause injury to themselves and others.88
The Anderson court, having determined that a common law cause
of action existed against a licensed vendor based upon the violation
of an alcohol beverage control statute, found it unnecessary to address whether a pure negligence cause of action89 existed against a
licensed vendor,90 but noted such a trend in other jurisdictions. 9'
In finding a cause of action for the plaintiffs in Bailey and Anderson on a common law negligence theory, West Virginia joins a
growing number of jurisdictions that impose civil liability on licensed
vendors for violations of alcohol beverage control statutes. 92 Although the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia uses pure
negligence principles concerning the creation of a foreseeable risk
of harm to the third parties, the duty found to have been breached
in each of the cases had its origin in statutes that prohibited the
sale of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person or a minor.
Accordingly, under the court's analysis, a violation of an alcohol
beverage control statute constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence, which is sufficient to give rise to a cause of action. 93 To
impose civil liability, however, the plaintiff must allege and prove

87. Id. at 72.
88. The Anderson court adopted the following factors to be considered in determining whether
the licensed vendor might reasonably foresee that someone other than the underage purchaser would
consume the beverages: (1) the quantity and character of beverages; (2) the time of the sale; (3) the
licensed vendor's observation of other persons with underage purchaser; (4) the purchaser's statements;
and (5) any other relevant circumstances of the sale or vendor's knowledge. Id. at 73.
89. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia refers to a cause of action based upon
pure negligence principles as a common law cause of action independent of a statutory violation.
90. Id. at 69.
91. Id.
92. For examples of jurisdictions that allow common law negligence actions for violations of
alcohol beverage control statutes, see supra note 21.
93. Bailey v. Black, 394 S.E.2d at 59.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/7
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that the purchaser was a person to whom the statute prohibited the
licensed vendor to sell alcoholic beverages, that the licensed vendor
knew or should have known the purchaser was such a person, and
that the violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the
injuries. The court concluded that the questions of negligence, due
care, proximate cause, and any contributory or intervening negligence of the injured party were questions to be considered by the
jury.14 The controlling factor in the court's decision to create a civil
cause of action against licensed vendors, under a common law negligence theory based on a statutory violation, was the belief that the
alcohol beverage control statutes established a minimum standard
of care and a duty not to sell alcoholic beverages to specified persons
95
in order to protect those persons and the safety of the general public.
2.

Social Hosts and Employers

In Overbaugh v. McCutcheon, 6 defendants Brady Cline Coal
Company, Gauley Coal Sales Company, and Holly Coal Company
97
hosted a Christmas party for employees and friends. McCutcheon
attended the party and consumed alcohol that was available on a
self-serve basis, and became noticeably drunk. Defendant Jack Cline
knew McCutcheon was intoxicated98 and intended to operate a motor
vehicle. Cline told McCutcheon not to drive and that he would arrange a ride home for him. After leaving the party on his own
volition, McCutcheon was involved in an accident, killing himself
and Elizabeth Overbaugh, and injuring the plaintiffs Franklin, Tony,
Stacey and Kevin Overbaugh. The plaintiffs brought an action for
wrongful death and personal injuries incurred as a result of the
accident. The trial court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, holding that there were certain duties imposed on defendants which, if breached, could result in civil liability.

94. Id. at 61; Anderson, 394 S.E.2d at 74.
95. Bailey, 394 S.E.2d at 60; Anderson, 394 S.E.2d at 67-68.
96. 396 S.E.2d 153 (%V.Va. 1990).
97. There is some question as to whether Donald McCutcheon was an employee of any of the
defendants. See id. at 154, n.1.
98. Id. at 155. McCutcheon's blood alcohol level was .22 percent at the time of his death. Id.
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The case was placed before the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia to answer the following certified questions: (1) whether
a social host who gratuitously furnishes intoxicating beverages to an
adult guest, knowing both that the guest is intoxicated and plans
on driving, is liable for injuries caused by the intoxicated guest?;
and (2) whether an employer, who gratuitously furnishes intoxicating
beverages to an intoxicated adult employee and subsequently exercises control over the employee, has a duty to prevent the employee
from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others?" The lower
court answered both questions in the affirmative. The Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia disagreed and refrained from creating
new causes of action which could hold a social host liable to third
parties, l° 0 and employers liable where there was a lack of affirmative

conduct that created an unreasonable risk to others. 10'
i. Social Host Liability
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia acknowledged
that there were two primary theories under which courts in other
jurisdictions have imposed social host liability. The first is a violation of a statute'0 2 and the second is under pure negligence principles. 13 The Overbaugh court found no legislation applicable to
social hosts and ruled that West Virginia Code § 60-3-22104 applied
only to licensed vendors. 0 5 Therefore, in the absence of legislation,
the court held there was no common law negligence cause of action
06
for violation of a statute.
99. Id. at 154.
100. Id. at 158.
101. Id. at 159.

102. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia did not distinguish a violation of an alcohol
beverage control statute as either negligence per se or prima facie evidence of negligence.

103. This Note uses the terminology "pure negligence" to refer to the same theory that the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia refers to as "common law negligence." See Overbaugh,
396 S.E.2d at 155.
104. For a discussion of the new State Retail Liquor License Act, W. VA. CODE § 60-3A-25
(Supp. 1990) repealing § 60-3-22 (1989), see supra notes 51, 52 and 56, and accompanying text. Section
60-3A-25(3) drops the language prohibiting the sale of alcoholic liquors to mental incompetents and
habitual drunkards and simply prohibits a licensee from selling, giving away or permitting the sale

of, gift of, or the procurement of any liquor for or to any person visibly intoxicated.
105. Overbaugh, 396 S.E.2d at 156.
106. Id.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/7
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In regard to a cause of action under pure negligence principles,
the plaintiffs argued the court should establish a new cause of action
0 7 that, "[o]ne who enunder the theory used in Price v. Halstead'
gages in affirmative conduct, and thereafter realizes or should realize
that such conduct has created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the
threatened harm."'' 0 In Price, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia recognized a new cause of action when passengers of
a vehicle provided and encouraged the visibly intoxicated driver to
consume alcohol and smoke marijuana.'0 9 The driver ultimately lost
control of his vehicle and collided into another vehicle, killing the
other driver and seriously injuring the passengers in the other vehicle.110 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that
a passenger may be found liable for injuries to a third party caused
by the intoxication of the driver of the vehicle in which he is riding,
if the passenger's conduct substantially encouraged or assisted the
driver's intoxication and the intoxication was the proximate cause
of the accident."'
Additionally, the plaintiff argued the court should use the logic
that the New Jersey Supreme Court used in Kelly v. Gwinnell,12 to
hold:
a host who serves liquor to an adult social guest, knowing both that the
guest is intoxicated and will thereafter be operating a motor vehicle, is liable for
injuries inflicted on a third party as a result of the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle by the adult guest when such negligence is caused by the intoxication."'

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia distinguished
Overbaugh from Kelly and Price by concluding that they involved
a far more egregious set of facts. In Kelly, the host was in a one-

107. Price v. Halstead, 355 S.E.2d 380, 387 (V. Va. 1987).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 389.
110. Id. at 383.
111. Id. at 389.
112. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
113. Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
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on-one situation with a noticeably intoxicated guest; 114 the host continued to serve him drinks and then walked him to his car. Here,
however, McCutcheon was one of a number of guests who served
himself intoxicating beverages, and when Cline noticed McCutcheon
was intoxicated he asked McCutcheon twice to wait for a ride home.'"
The court distinguished Overbaugh from Price by concluding the
facts did not support a finding that any of the defendants in any
way were engaged in the affirmative conduct of serving alcohol to
McCutcheon or actively encouraging its consumption and therefore
did not meet the standards for liability set forth in Price.16 Therefore, the court refrained from creating a new cause of action, and
held "there is generally no liability on the part of a social host who
gratuitously furnishes alcohol to a guest when an injury to an innocent third party occurs as a result of the guest's intoxication.""' 7
The court concluded there was good reason for following the
general rule at common law," 8 reasoning that social hosts: (1) should
not be expected to exercise the same amount of supervision over
guests as licensed vendors; (2) are not as organized or have the
financial wherewithal to control guests; and (3) do not have the
expertise to judge a person's capacities." 9 Additionally, the court
adhered to the principle that the legislature was better able to assess
such a cause of action. 20
ii. Employer Liability
The second certified question before the Overbaugh court was
whether a cause of action existed against an employer for furnishing
alcoholic beverages to an adult employee who subsequently injured
third parties as a result of intoxication. The plaintiffs, relying heavily
on the holdings in Robertson v. LeMaster2 1 and Otis Engineering,
114. At the time of the accident, the guest's blood alcohol level was .286%.
115. Overbaugh, 396 S.E.2d at 158.
116. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 387.
117. Overbaugh, 396 S.E.2d at 158.

118. Id. at 8. For a discussion on the general rule at common law, see supra notes 1, 2 and
accompanying text.
119. Overbaugh, 396 S.E.2d at 157.
120. Id.
121. 301 S.E.2d 563 (W. Va. 1983).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss2/7
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Corp. v. Clark,122 argued the employer had a duty to prevent an
employee from operating a motor vehicle which could cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others. The Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia found in Robertson that a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the threatened harm existed where an employer required an employee to work continuously for over twentyseven hours and then escorted the employee to his car and instructed
him to go home. 123 In Otis, the Texas Supreme Court relied on
Robertson to hold an employer liable for damages resulting from
an employee's automobile accident which killed two people. 2 The
employer, in Otis, knew the employee had a drinking problem, a
history of drinking on the job, and had been drinking, and yet
suggested he go home and escorted him to his automobile.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia distinguished
the facts of this case from Otis, concluding, first, that the employer
had no knowledge McCutcheon had a drinking problem or a history
of drinking'*2 Secondly, Cline did not instruct McCutcheon to leave
126
or take him to his car, but instructed him to remain at the party.
The court, therefore, held there was a lack of affirmative conduct
creating an unreasonable risk of harm on the part of the employer
furnishing alcohol to the employee and refused to find the employer
liable under the facts of this case. 27
In holding there is generally no liability on the part of the social
host who gratuitously furnishes alcohol to a guest who subsequently
injures third parties as a result of intoxication, West Virginia joins
several other jurisdictions that are reluctant to impose civil liability
against social hosts 2- The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia did not find a basis in statutory enactment and therefore no
cause of action under common law negligence principles for a vi-

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
principles

668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983).
Robertson, 301 S.E.2d at 567.
Otis, 668 S.W.2d at 311.
Overbaugh, 396 S.E.2d at 159.
Id.
Id.
For examples of jurisdictions that do not use violations of statutes or pure negligence
to extend liability to social hosts or employers, see supra notes 28-29.
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olation of an alcohol beverage control statute. 129 The court noted,
however, if a statute read that alcoholic beverages shall not be "sold
or given" and a violation occurred, liability may be found. 30 This
suggests that if a statute was applicable to a social host or employer
and a violation occurred, the Court would recognize a cause of
action under common law negligence principles for violating such
a statute. The Court evaluated only West Virginia Code § 60-3-22,'1'
and did not acknowledge West Virginia Code §§ 60-7-12a(b), 60-322a(b), or 60-8-20a(b), 132 which prohibit "any person" to knowingly
buy for, give or furnish alcoholic beverages to anyone under twentyone years of age. These provisions suggest that a cause of action
could be maintained against a social host or employer who violates
these statutes and would explain why the Court held there is "generally no liability on the part of the social host.' ' 33
In regard to a cause of action under a pure negligence approach,
the Overbaugh Court concluded the facts of this case did not support
a finding that any defendants were negligent by engaging in the
affirmative conduct of serving alcoholic beverages to McCutcheon
or actively encouraging its consumption, nor was there a breach of
the duty to protect against the threatened harm. 34 The controlling
factors in Overbaugh include: (1) the host was not in a one-to-one
situation with a guest but was hosting a number of guests; (2) the
host was not serving alcoholic beverages, but provided such beverages on a self-serve basis; (3) the host did not force or actively
encourage the guest to imbibe, but rather he did so voluntarily; and
(4) the host did not escort the guest to his car and neither requested
nor ordered him to drive home. This suggests that in the proper
fact situation, civil liability could be imposed upon a social host,
although the court implied in its reasoning that a licensed vendor
should be held to a higher standard of care than a social host.35
129. Overbaugh, 396 S.E.2d at 156.

130. Id.at 156, n.4.
131. W. VA. CODE § 60-3-22 (1989) was repealed by § 60-3A-25 (Supp. 1990), see supra note
104.
132. For further discussion of these provisions, see supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
133. Overbaugh, 396 S.E.2d at 158.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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In regard to the second certified question concerning employer
liability, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in holding
an employer furnishing alcoholic beverages to an employee will not
be held liable to a third party where there is a lack of affirmative
conduct creating an unreasonable risk of harm to third persons, but
implied a cause of action could be maintained under pure negligence
principles against an employer. 36 The court noted, however, its holding was limited to the facts of this case and left unresolved the issue
of liability when an employer engaged in affirmative conduct as
shown in the Robertson and Otis cases.' 37
The reasoning of the Overbaugh court's decision is not clear for
rejecting liability for social hosts because of an absence of a basis
in pure negligence principles, while acknowledging a basis in pure
negligence principles for employers. The court may have distinguished a social host from an employer hosting a party for employees. Employers, unlike most social hosts, generally have the
ability to insure and can better bear the risk of such a loss. Additionally, because of the employer-employee relationship, an employer may also be able to monitor the amount of alcohol consumed,
whereas the social host is faced with the awkward situation of denying a guest further access to alcoholic beverages. The court may
have used the employer-employee relationship to establish a superior
duty for employers. Such a distinction based on the special relationship between employers and employees would explain the inconsistency of the court's failure to find a basis in pure negligence
principles for social hosts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There has been a movement towards holding licensed vendors,
social hosts and employers liable for the torts of their intoxicated
customers, guests or employees. Three methods have been used to
impose such liability: (1) negligence per se for violation of alcohol

136. Id. at 159.
137. Id. at 159, n.9.
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beverage control statutes; 13 (2) common law negligence principles
based upon the violation of a statutory duty; 139 and (3) pure negligence principles.1 40
West Virginia has chosen to impose liquor liability on licensed
vendors under common law negligence principles based upon a statutory violation.' 4' A violation of an alcohol beverage control statute
constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence, which is sufficient to
give rise to a cause of action. To be successful, the plaintiff must
prove he and the purchaser are persons protected by the statute,
that the licensed vendor knew or should have known the purchaser
was such a person protected by a statute, and that the violation of
a statute was the proximate cause of the injuries.
However, West Virginia has not yet recognized a cause of action
against a social host or employer for the torts of their intoxicated
guests, but has alluded to such cause of action existing where a host
engages in the affirmative conduct of serving alcohol to a visibly
and then takes
intoxicated guest, actively encourages its consumption,
42
leave.
to
her
instructs
and
car
the guest to her
The time has come in West Virginia for licensed vendors to realize that they can be held liable for the torts of their intoxicated
customers, and the time may be coming for social hosts and employers as well.
R. Scott Summers

138. For a discussion of liability under the theory of negligence per se for violations of alcohol
beverage control statutes, see supra notes 18, 19, 32 and accompanying text.
139. For a discussion of liability under the theory of common law negligence, see supra notes
20-22, 33 and accompanying text.

140. For a discussion of liability under the theory of pure negligence, see supra notes 25, 3537 and accompanying text.
141. See Bailey v. Black, 394 S.E.2d 58; Anderson v. Moulder, 394 S.E.2d 61.
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